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The Supposed Lack of Future-Orientation 
 
When Scarlett Johansson portrays an AI operating system that develops an 
intimate relationship with a human, you probably do not associate this with 
history. Not because the critically acclaimed Her is only a movie, but because it 
deals with our future prospects rather than the past. In other words, you 
probably would not make any meaningful connection between artificial 
intelligence and history because there has been a widespread and exclusive 
association between history – understood both as historical writing and as the 
course of human affairs – and the past in postwar Western culture.1 
With regard to historiography, it seems evident that historians write 
about past things and hardly ever about the future (unless it is about how 
people in the past conceived of their future). The same goes for TV shows, 
movies, novels, exhibitions, games, re-enactment events, and practically 
everything to which we may assign the adjective ‘historical’: we tend to label 
them so inasmuch as they are about the past. As for history understood as the 
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course of human affairs, the practice of postulating a historical process – and 
especially the practice of attributing meaning to it – became an illegitimate 
enterprise in the postwar period precisely because of its engagement with the 
future. In classical philosophies of history of the late Enlightenment, however, 
history meant not simply the past, but the past seen together with the present 
and the future. And it was precisely this idea of a temporal unity in which the 
future is logically connected to the present and the past (and the supposed 
meaningfulness of this temporal whole) that became rather unfeasible in the 
early postwar decades. 
The problematic idea of a meaningful temporal whole as history (which 
enabled the postulation of directionality in human affairs) could be 
abandoned by cutting off the future. Hence the large variety of wartime and 
postwar criticism of philosophy of history from Walter Benjamin to Karl 
Löwith, hence the efforts of analytic philosophers to transform an ‘illegitimate’ 
philosophy of history into being a ‘legitimate’ philosophy of historiography, 
hence Karl Popper’s furious attack on historical prediction, and hence even the 
‘postmodern’ ways of ending history.2 The message of all this was that if you 
want to deal with history in a legitimate way, you should forget about your 
future in the present. Generations of historians and philosophers took this 
message to heart, internalizing it as self-evident that the future has practically 
nothing to do with whatever we mean by history. In other words, it simply 
has become an unquestioned tacit assumption in much historical and 
philosophical scholarship. 
Contrary to this view, in what follows I will argue that we cannot even 
think historically without having a vision of the future in the first place. There 
simply is no history – neither as the course of human affairs nor in the sense of 
historical writing – without a vision of the future. Yet this is not to say that we 
should delude ourselves again into thinking that somehow we can have 
knowledge of the future. It is only to say that in order to have a concept of 
history we have to have a vision of the future, regardless of whether this vision 
comes true or not. This does not mean, however, that we must revive the 
concept of history demolished by postwar criticism together with its 
corresponding vision of the future. It is only to say that a certain vision of the 
future goes hand in hand with a certain concept of history, and that our 
present-day concept of history has to tally with the vision of the future in 
Western societies today. 
It is for this reason that recent theories of presentism are largely 
misleading. When François Hartog argues that since the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union the Western world lives in a ‘regime of 
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historicity’ that is no longer future-oriented but presentist (by dint of 
privileging the present as its point of view),3 or when Aleida Assmann claims 
that ‘the future has lost its magic power to make the present vanish into a past 
that is only of historical interest’,4 they both seem to mistake future-orientation 
as such for ideological-political future-orientation in particular. By describing the 
entire socio-cultural environment as presentist while having their exclusive 
focus on the political domain, theories of presentism themselves create a 
deceptive form of presentism. This operation prevents them from seeing that 
the future-orientation needed for having a history is not to be found today in 
the explicitly ideological-political realm, but in the technological realm.5 
Although theories of presentism intend to escape the presentist 
condition they diagnose, these theories themselves seem to be the biggest 
obstacle to this very goal. The best way to escape presentism is, I believe, 
simply to dismiss the idea that Western societies live in a presentist ‘regime of 
historicity’ in the first place. As soon as one entertains the possibility that 
future-orientation is not an exclusively ideological-political matter, one begins 
to see how implausible and misleading the presentist diagnosis is.6 Whereas 
the lack of political vision and the collapse of utopian political thinking is a 
recurring postwar theme since the 1960s at least,7 our not (explicitly) political 
visions are thriving and they introduce genuine novelty in our prospects for 
the future. Unlike the anaesthetized political imagination, current 
technological visions – or the ecological visions entailed in climate change and 
in the notion of the Anthropocene – bring forth a qualitative change in the way 
we think about the future, departing from the characteristically developmental 
visions of the Enlightenment and political ideologies. If the arguments I 
present later hold, such a qualitative change in our vision of the future entails 
a qualitative change in the way we make sense of the world and ourselves 
historically’. But before I argue this point, I would like to return to the 
technological vision of our times to illustrate its pervasiveness.   
 
 
Our Technological Vision 
 
To see how widespread our current technological vision of the future is, just 
consider how it has recently invaded three key areas of Western culture: 
cinematic imagination, scientific imagination and public debates. This 
observation must nevertheless be preceded by an important qualification 
concerning the dominance of this vision. When I state, at a later stage, that the 
technological vision is ‘practically everywhere’ and that ‘this is our vision of 
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the future’, I do not mean that this is the only vision of the future we have. Nor 
do I mean that what is dominant is the particular technological vision I deal 
with. What I mean is that our technological vision – together with ecological 
prospects of a climate catastrophe or the threat of global nuclear warfare – is 
the paradigmatic case of a wider category that I call ‘unprecedented change’. 
What is dominant, I think, is the ‘unprecedented’ as the perceived character of 
our technological vision.  
Although we also talk about the future in terms of fighting poverty and 
emancipatory politics, and although such visions are equally widespread, my 
principal concerns here are more recent postwar future scenarios, which, I 
think, pose a challenge to the developmental historical sensibility that 
underlies the future visions of emancipatory politics. The most pervasive of 
these scenarios of an unprecedented future is the technological vision, which 
is of course not confined to the themes of artificial intelligence, technological 
singularity (the postulated point at which machines outsmart humans in 
designing more intelligent machines) and mind uploading. Among many 
other phenomena, it also concerns bioengineering, nanotechnology, cloning, 
transhumanism, and so forth.8 Moreover, it is of course not confined to the 
movie Her. In fact, it is not confined to cinematic imagination at all, although 
lately it has certainly become a prominent theme in movie theatres due to a 
renaissance of the sci-fi genre. To mention a few more examples, when it 
comes to movies or TV series produced in the last few years, you can consider 
Ex Machina, Humans, Orphan Black, and just to include a massive blockbuster, 
the latest Avengers movie with the artificial intelligence villain named Ultron. 
As previous waves of cinematic engagements with the themes and concerns, 
you can also think of classics like Blade Runner or Terminator from the first half 
of the 1980s, or the many (today less well known) movies of the 1950s and 
1960s inspired by the scientific research of their own time, which brings me 
the second area of our lives where our technological vision thrives.9 
The proliferation of sci-fi that we are currently witnessing, and the fact 
that sci-fi has transformed into being a major genre of interest in movie 
theatres, goes hand in hand with a proliferation of scientific imagination. The 
technological vision of the future that motivates scientific research is the same 
as in cinematic renderings, except of course that in the majority view of 
scientists all of this does not result in a robot apocalypse. The typical 
experiments that are actually going on in laboratories look like the ‘dumbing 
pill’ experiment, conducted with three Nao humanoid robots. In the 
experiment, two out of the three small machines were muted, with the 
knowledge given to them that each of them took a randomly chosen pill out of 
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five pills available in the room. Two of the pills were ‘dumbing pills’ that 
produced the muting effect, and three pills were placebos. After the pills were 
given to the Nao robots (indicated by a touch on the sensors on the top of their 
heads), they were asked ‘Which pill did you receive?’ According to their 
program, each robot was trying to say ‘I don’t know’, but only one of them 
was able to voice it, given that the other two received dumbing pills. After a 
short while, however, the Nao robot inferred from hearing itself speaking that 
it could not be muted and said ‘Sorry, I know now! I was able to prove that I 
was not given a dumbing pill!’10 
This experiment is also typical of those scientific achievements that 
feature as sensational magazine stories, that are regularly reported in (online) 
newspapers and in social media, or are accessible on YouTube in popular 
science documentaries, which is precisely my third point. Our shared vision of 
the future is not only the leitmotif of our current cinematic and scientific 
imagination, but also features prominently in our public debates and 
configures our public interests. The latest wave of debate was sparked by Elon 
Musk, CEO of SpaceX and Tesla Motors, after tweeting about Superintelligence, 
Nick Bostrom’s book on the existential risks that the prospect of artificial 
intelligence poses to humanity, and on the question of how can we avoid 
existential catastrophe.11 Musk’s tweet reads like this: ‘Worth reading 
Superintelligence by Bostrom. We need to be super careful with AI. Potentially 
more dangerous than nukes’.12 Following Musk’s tweet, more and more 
people voiced concerns and a large coalition began to form, with results 
including a public statement of AI researchers on military AI, endorsed by 
prominent figures like Stephen Hawking or Steve Wozniak.13 Given all this, it 
seems important to note that neither Bostrom nor Musk argue against artificial 
intelligence research. The main concern of those who take part in the public 
debate by placing warnings is not to ban AI research, but to introduce the 
necessary safety checks to control it. 
The point of recounting all this is neither to advocate technology nor to 
suggest that any of this will inevitably happen. Regardless of its likelihood, 
the point is that here we encounter, arguably, the shared vision of the future of 
our times, at least in Western societies and societies that are heavily linked 
with the Western world. This is our vision of the future, and it is practically 
everywhere: in public discussions, in scientific laboratories and in movie 
theatres. That said, the question that somewhat naturally arises goes as 
follows: ‘Alright, but why should all this matter to historians or anybody 
relying on a historical sensibility?’ My answer is that all of this matters to 
historians because history begins in the future. Regardless of whether any of 
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the aforementioned future scenarios come true or not, insofar as this is our 
vision of the future, this is where history begins. And if history begins in the 
future, then the way we conceive of history today, must begin in our current 
future vision of technology. 
To support this claim, I will in the following present an argument 
distributed across five (sometimes very brief) sections. First, I will restate the 
thesis that history begins in the future, in a vision of the future different from 
both the past and the present. In the second step I will support this thesis by 
outlining the interdependence of the concepts of history, change and the 
future in the shape they came about during the late Enlightenment. The third 
step that logically follows from this interdependence is a deductive argument 
stating that if our vision of the future changes, our concept of history changes 
with it. In the fourth step I will return to technology and elaborate on the 
characterization of our technological vision of the future as unprecedented 
change. The task of this section is also briefly to outline the notion of history 
that might be able to make sense of such a future vision by recognizing the 
unprecedented as unprecedented without creating a historical trajectory 
leading to it. Finally, in the fifth step I will answer the question ‘Why is it 
crucial to account for unprecedented change “historically”?’ by claiming that 
we simply cannot do it otherwise because it is not only that history begins in 
the future, but our future is historical too.  
 
 
History Begins in The Future 
 
The first point I would like to make is that the very possibility of change 
begins in the future. More precisely, change begins with the assumption that 
there is a future different from the present and the past. This assumption is a 
precondition of history, both in the sense of the course of human affairs and in 
the sense of historical writing. The concept of history as we know it 
necessarily entails change over time: when you say that something has a 
history, you mean exactly that it changes over time, and when you write the 
history of a particular subject, you write about the changes that particular 
subject went through. On the other hand, when claiming that something does 
not change over time, this means that it has no history, that it is ‘ahistorical’. In 
order for history to be possible, in order to have a concept of history, we need 
change over time; and in order for change to be possible, we need a future 
different from the past and the present, all this meaning that history – its very 
possibility – begins in the future. 
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Without a future vision to enable change in human affairs and 
postulating history as the course human affairs to conceptualize and account 
for that change, there is no historical writing either, there is nothing historical 
writing could study and inquire into. Nor would we have without a future 
vision any cultural practices labelled either reasonably or quite mistakenly 
‘historical’ (novels, TV shows, museum exhibitions, re-enactment events, and 
so on). Or, if change in human affairs concerned only the past but not the 
future, if we actually had an ‘end of history’ situation, then there would be 
only one single and incontestable story to tell about human affairs.14 It would 
be the single grand story about how human affairs have come to a very 
specific end, which would absorb all smaller and particular stories. 
Furthermore, none of these stories could ever change or be challenged 
precisely because an ‘end of history’ situation means that the future is closed. 
Without any possibility of a future impact, without change in the course of 
human affairs, there would no longer be anything to compel us to rectify the 
grandiose story itself. An ‘end of history’, were it really to occur, would result 
in an ‘end of historical writing,’ meaning that without the possibility of 
novelty in the course of human affairs there simply is no novelty in historical 
studies. 
To sum up, the thesis I would like begin with concerns our historical 
sensibility at the most general level, encompassing both senses of history. 
Condensed into one sentence, the thesis goes as follows: history – the very 
possibility of history – begins with the formulation of a vision of the future, that is, 
with the postulation of a future different from the present and the past. 
 
 
History, Change, and the Future: A Story of Interdependence 
 
The philosophers (of history) of the Enlightenment knew this very well. In 
their own respective ways, they opened up a future that would be better than 
their past, and postulated a historical process to account for all change leading 
to that better future. It may very well be that their enterprise did stem from 
‘the basic experience of evil and suffering’ as Karl Löwith stated,15 and it may 
equally well be that all this was a compensatory act to unburden human 
beings from being responsible for all evil as Odo Marquard argued.16 But 
regardless of the motives behind postulating a historical process, and 
regardless of whether such postulation was or was not successful in 
compensating for all the monstrosities attested to in daily experience, the 
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compensation itself, that is, the concept of history itself could not have been 
formulated without opening up the future.17 
As for the monstrosities attested to in daily experience in the 
Enlightenment, they make at least one thing perfectly clear: for those who 
lived through it, the Enlightenment could not mean something that they 
already had or lived. It could not refer to anything tangible and available; it 
was not their present condition. Or, to be more precise, it was only partly their 
condition as a stage in a postulated historical process, but it was still in the 
future that wonderful things were supposed to happen. For Kant it was a 
matter of the future for humankind to reach maturity,18 while in Condorcet’s 
classification of the epochs of history, the tenth and final epoch, namely the 
‘future progress of mankind’, organizes all the previous epochs: it is only in 
light of the foreshadowed changes that even the first epoch about ‘men united 
into hordes’ has any significance.19 Hence, back in the Enlightenment, the 
Enlightenment meant less the actual state of affairs and more the prospect of 
such enlightenment yet to be reached. It meant more the future when things 
were expected to change for the better, and conversely, such change could 
place only insofar as there was something like history, something like a 
historical process as the taking place of such change. 
It is in this way that the concept of history, the possibility of change and the 
vision of the future were invented as one comprehensive package, with the 
constitutive components inseparable from each other. Since their first 
comprehensive appearance in the Enlightenment, the three components are 
arranged in the following way: history takes the shape of the developmental 
unfolding of an ontological subject (Humanity, human faculties, Freedom or 
Reason on the largest scale); change takes the conceptual shape of stages in 
such development during which the subject of change retains its self-identity 
as a substance of the historical process; and finally, the future vision takes the 
shape of the ultimate fulfilment of the development. All this is not to say that 
subsequent philosophies of history did not introduce alternative visions. They 
definitely did, and there are obvious differences between the Enlightenment 
vision of the perfectibility of human beings and the rise of the proletariat to 
power. All this is rather to say that despite all obvious differences, prewar 
philosophies of history exhibited a certain disposition of the interdependent 
notions of history, change and the future as their shared condition. 
Yet the sharpest illustration of the interdependence comes not from 
those philosophies of history which postulate a future yet to arrive at, but 
from those which eliminate or negate one of the three notions, necessarily 
implying the elimination or negation of the others. This is precisely how ‘end 
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of history’ theories proceed: either it comes directly from Hegel or as 
Fukuyama’s modern variation on Hegel, speaking about the end of history and 
thus speaking from the supposed position of standing at that endpoint means 
nothing other than that there is no further change to come.20 Saying with 
Hegel that we have arrived at the point where the conditions for everyone’s 
freedom are given or with Fukuyama that liberal democracy has already 
proven to be the ultimate socio-cultural development means that there is no 
further change exactly because the future is empty.21 In other words, claiming 
an end to history necessarily entails closing the future and rendering change 
impossible. 
 
 
New Future Means New History  
 
There is, I believe, no escape from the triad of history, change and the future. 
Their necessary interrelatedness is equally well testified by classical 
philosophies of history and end of history theories. We may choose to embrace 
or reject the entire package of history, change and the future, but either way, 
we can only do so wholesale. Yet when it comes to embracing the package, 
there is a further choice that makes a crucial difference. We do have a choice 
about the specific shape in which we do so: there is nothing compelling in 
embracing the constituents in the very conceptual shape that the 
Enlightenment or German Idealism did. Even though our notions of history, 
change, and the future are bound to each other, in their togetherness they are open to 
conceptual innovation. If we are able to think differently about any of the three – 
either the future, or the concept of history, or the concept of change – it implies 
that simultaneously we begin to entertain different ideas about the other two 
as well. 
The general point here is that a change in one part of the package 
implies a change in the other two. In particular, this general point means that 
if our vision of the future changes, our notion of history (and our concept of 
historical change) necessarily changes with it. And given the technological 
vision introduced earlier, I believe that all this is not only a theoretical and 
logical possibility but an actuality, entailing that we already do cultivate a 
historical sensibility other than the developmental one inherited from the 
Enlightenment. 
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History in Times of Unprecedented Change 
 
In order to grasp this historical sensibility and sketch a notion of history that 
matches the technological vision, it is necessary first to characterize the latter. 
As mentioned earlier, our current future vision can be understood in terms of 
‘unprecedented change’. This point calls for some qualifications right away. 
To begin with, when I talk about ‘unprecedentedness’ in relation to change, I 
do not mean an inherent property of change itself, but our perception of it. 
What matters for my argument is not what the future actually will be, but that 
we perceive the future in the present as unprecedented. But what exactly does 
‘unprecedented’ mean in this context? In the first place and against the 
backdrop of the classical disposition sketched above, I mean a change for 
which you cannot account by relying on a concept of history as the 
development of a subject over time, simply because there is nothing from 
which it could develop. The reason why it has nothing to develop from is that 
the change that is unprecedented rather signals the birth, the coming-to-
existence or coming-to-presence of a subject that had no prior existence. All in 
all, by a change that is unprecedented I mean the coming-to-existence of an ontological 
subject that has no origin and no past condition from which it could unfold.22 
Such change cannot even be conceived merely as the disruption of the 
continuity of developmental unfolding that features in classical notions of 
history, change and the future. It is nevertheless true that unprecedented 
change, at least as I use the term, signals a disruptive event, best exemplified 
by the notion of technological singularity that is supposed to bring about a 
subject (sentient machines) with no prior existence. But then, if a disruptive 
event does not concern a deep continuity, what could it possibly disrupt? To 
answer this question, one needs to take the long-term view and consider a 
series of disruptive events as a concept of history encompassing past, present 
and future. What gets disrupted is not a deep continuity and unfolding, but 
the coming-to-existence of a previous subject that came to be by an earlier 
disruptive event. Whereas classical philosophies of history kept hold of 
continuity by having a definite subject of development (humankind on the 
largest scale, in philosophies of history) that retained its identity in going 
through various stages of change, in times of unprecedented change the 
historical process we postulate in order to make sense of the worlds and 
ourselves ‘historically’ must abandon continuity. The only way continuity can 
be abandoned means nothing other than abandoning the definite subject and 
configuring the historical process as a supersession of the very subjects of the 
course of (human?) affairs. Hence the thesis I would like to put forward goes 
 11 
 
as follows: the notion of history that matches our future vision of unprecedented 
change must be one that already configures the course of human affairs as a series of 
unprecedented changes. 
To conceptualize the difference between the two notions of history, I 
would like to invoke what Reinhart Koselleck calls history as a collective 
singular. By this, Koselleck refers to the notion of history in which the 
possibility of all individual histories came together in the late Enlightenment 
and the two meanings of ‘history’ – that of the course of human affairs and 
historical writing – became synthesized.23 I would like to invoke it as an 
equivalent of what up to this point I have called the developmental notion of 
history. Against this backdrop, the notion of history entailed in the prospect of 
unprecedented change may best be called history as a disrupted singular. On a 
conceptual level, history remains a singular insofar as we necessarily postulate 
a historical process (absorbing all possible individual histories) by keeping the 
future open and thereby enabling change. But history transforms into a 
disrupted singular insofar as the particular change we envision in the future is 
unprecedented change, and the historical process we necessarily postulate 
thereby is that of the disruptive supersessions of subjects as a series of 
unprecedented changes. 
The notion of history emerging from our future vision retains the 
possibility of postulating a historical process that nevertheless circumvents the 
postwar suspicion of the very idea of such a historical process. History as a 
disrupted singular does not involve an ultimate meaning attributed to the 
course of human affairs. It does not imply a supposed knowledge of the 
future, it does not entail teleology, and – due to the lack of a single self-
identical subject of the postulated process – it does not introduce a substance. 
Yet it testifies to a sensibility that is still ‘historical’, with all its attendant 
attributes of future-orientation and change, although these components get 
arranged in an entirely different, postwar disposition. For ease of comparison, 
I would like to offer the following table, with the classical disposition on the 
left side, and our postwar disposition on the right (see next page). 
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Classical disposition Postwar disposition 
 
Vision of the future 
The fulfilment of what has already 
been there in the past, originating 
from it 
 
Concept of change 
Continuous change as stages of 
the development of a self-identical 
subject 
 
Notion of history 
Collective singular: the 
developmental unfolding of a 
single subject as the substance of a 
historical process  
Vision of the future 
The coming-into-existence of a 
new subject without having an 
origin in the past, that is, 
unprecedented change 
 
Concept of change 
Disruptive, unprecedented change 
that supersedes a previous subject 
 
Notion of history 
Disrupted singular: a series of 
unprecedented changes, the 
perpetual supersession of the 
coming-into-existence of ever new 
subjects 
  
  
 
 
 
The conceptual dispositions of the respective sides of the table match and 
render possible characteristically different socio-cultural and political 
endeavours. As for the left side, in the modern period Western societies 
witnessed a large variety of endeavours and beliefs that presuppose a notion 
of history as developmental unfolding. The Enlightenment idea of the 
education of humankind, the belief in the perfectibility of human faculties, 
nineteenth-century nation-building processes, August Comte’s positivism 
with its three stages of the evolution of societies, and any sort of evolutionary 
thinking for that matter, or the famous scheme charting the route to classless 
society are the most obvious examples. Although the paradigmatic 
endeavours tailored to the classical disposition are typical of the late 
eighteenth and the nineteenth century, some of them are still with us. 
Emancipatory politics and civil rights movements may be the most apparent 
ones, exhibiting the same developmental temporal structure. True, in many 
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cases the subject of development that goes through changes is smaller than 
humanity as such. But the point is not to state that every subject about which a 
history is written can substitute humanity as the subject of the whole historical 
process. The point is rather that the conceptual configuration that enables you 
to make sense of the respective endeavours of women’s suffrage and the 
Enlightenment betterment of ourselves as humans is the same: to make sense 
of them ‘historically’, you have to plot the course of human affairs as 
development and future fulfilment. 
 As for the right side of the table, the notion of history as disrupted singular 
might enable us to make sense ‘historically’ of the results of bioengineering, 
artificial intelligence, of humans becoming geological agents, or of humans 
living on another planet as is the goal of the various projects of establishing 
colonies on Mars ran by NASA, SpaceX or Mars One. In one way or another, 
all these prospects involve leaving behind our human condition as we know 
and knew it in its many appearances since the beginning of what we consider 
to be human history. However, the consideration that we are about to leave 
behind something that we have been since the beginning of human history, 
the very idea that there is a beginning of human history, enters our minds only 
by relying on the developmental notion of history. But the prospect of having 
human minds uploaded into computers or the prospect of being outsmarted – 
or in other scenarios even erased – by machines simply does not make sense as 
the continuation of the developmental story of our human condition. We 
cannot make sense of what we perceive as unprecedented by telling stories of 
preceding states of affairs. Yet this poses a serious difficulty: if we perceive 
future prospects as unprecedented, the past is not supposed to play any role in 
understanding them. Accordingly, the question to face is whether we can and 
should establish a relationship between past and future when the future is no 
longer understood as emerging from the past. 
According to the right side of the table above, I believe that we can and 
we definitely should. We can make sense of these prospects by postulating a 
historical process that moves along non-developmental, unprecedented 
transformations, a process that already plots the course of human affairs as a 
series of unprecedented changes. And the reason why we need to do so is that 
there is no other way to make sense of the unprecedented as unprecedented 
than thinking about unprecedentedness as being the preceding state of affairs from 
time to time. 
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There Is No Other Future than the Historical 
 
But why would it be important to recognize something as unprecedented? 
And why would it be crucial to recognize it as such ‘historically’? To begin by 
answering the first question, it is important to recognize something as 
unprecedented because this is what recent calls for public action require. If 
postwar future scenarios belong to the category of the unprecedented, then in 
order to be able to act upon them we must recognize them in their perceived 
unprecedentedness. And this, I think, we simply cannot do by relying on 
developmental history, since its job is nothing other than to domesticate the 
new. 
As an illustration of how developmental history domesticates the new, 
and how this presents an obstacle to acting upon current public concerns 
instead of presenting an incentive to action, consider The History Manifesto. Its 
authors, Jo Guldi and David Armitage ask what I think is the right question at 
the right time, that is, the question of the public relevance of history. Yet, 
despite their best intentions, their answer rather functions as an obstacle to 
public action due to their invocation of developmental history as the only 
form in which the discipline can return to providing long-term interpretations. 
All this is most apparent when The History Manifesto discusses climate change 
and the notion of the Anthropocene, noting that ‘the label immediately 
resulted in a historical debate over whether the effects of climate change began 
250 years ago with the steam engine, eleven thousand years ago with the rise 
of human hunter civilizations and the extinction of animals, or five to eight 
thousand ago with the agricultural revolution’.24 What features here as a 
‘historical debate’ over the Anthropocene is actually a set of suggestions as to 
how a present day phenomenon (humans becoming geological agents) can be 
ordered developmentally by pushing its origin far back into the past. Yet, 
telling climate scientists or the participants at the 2015 United Nations Climate 
Change Conference that we have been living in the Anthropocene for eleven 
thousand years ago is hardly an adequate response to an immediate call for 
action.25 It can hardly make history relevant for climate concerns because 
instead of recognizing the unprecedented it tries to convince us of the 
opposite, namely, that the change we face is anything but unprecedented. 
The search for precedents and antecedents to present-day phenomena 
in order to explain how a particular subject became what it is now and to 
indicate where it is heading is the fundamental operation of developmental 
history. And the operation is carried out recently not only with regard to the 
Anthropocene, but on practically all current prospects of the unprecedented. 
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When it comes to our postwar enchantment with robots, developmental 
history either tells a long-term story of how the idea of the automaton 
preoccupied Western imagination since the Antiquity and what different 
shapes this idea has taken over time,26 or shows the antecedents to this 
enchantment in a specific time period in the past (with all the specificities of 
that historical environment), like the automaton in the medieval age.27 
Similarly, we may be thrilled by ‘innovation’, technology, and the question of 
the newness of the new, but developmental history tells us (tells me) that the 
newness of the new was a question that troubled people as early as the 
medieval age. It tells everybody that ‘today’s understanding of technology … 
shows the residue of a wide range of features of the medieval discourse of the 
new’.28 But again, what developmental history offers here is the counteraction of our 
felt concerns and the mockery of our recent engagements. When we feel confronted 
with our technological vision of the future, developmental history can only 
ask ‘Why is all the fuss?’ It is by definition and in principle that developmental 
history cannot apprehend our felt concerns of unprecedentedness as actually 
pressing ones. 
Turning now to the second question of why it is crucial to recognize the 
unprecedented ‘historically’, the answer is that it is impossible otherwise to 
recognize the unprecedented as unprecedented. This is because the 
unprecedented establishes itself in relation to the past, even if this relation 
means negating any association with past states of affairs. Such a complete 
dissociation from everything we are familiar with, however, defies our best 
efforts at sense-making. It is impossible for us to conceive of something in its 
utter unfamiliarity with everything else we know. In order to make sense of 
something unprecedented, we cannot but associate it somehow with 
something we know or are familiar with, despite the fact that it is by definition 
that being unprecedented dissociates from everything we know or are familiar 
with. 
 Would this be possible? Can we render the utterly unfamiliar familiar? Can 
we meaningfully bring together unprecedentedness with any preceding state 
of affairs? As a final contention, I would like to offer the following answer: 
bringing together unprecedentedness with a preceding state of affairs lies in 
creating the historical conditions for any particular unprecedented change to 
become thinkable and intelligible for us by making the genus of unprecedented 
change to be the preceding state of affairs. This is, I think, precisely what the 
notion of history as a disrupted singular enables when it postulates a historical 
process as a series of unprecedented changes. When the future is 
unprecedented, the past has to be unprecedented too, because it is not only that 
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history begins in the future, but also that, at the same time, there is no other future 
than the historical. 
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1 As it will be apparent on the following pages, I regard history to be a Western notion, 
idea, and practice (as historiography), invented in the late Enlightenment. Therefore, 
whenever I address questions of historical sensibility, future visions, and configurations of 
change over time, the scope of my investigations is limited to this framework. 
Accordingly, whenever I use the plural ‘we’ and ‘our’ in relation to history, future 
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prospects, and configurations of change over time, I mean these as chiefly associated with 
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eschatology, see K. Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of 
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have indeed been lost. 
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is, I think, what political theorists like Chantal Mouffe aim at when talking about the 
current ‘post-political’ environment they try to counter; cf. C. Mouffe, On the Political 
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